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THE ATTEMPTED MURDER OF THE 
MIRANDA DECISION 
 
Published in slightly different form in Athens Human Rights Festival, p. 9 (April 21-22, 2001). 
Author: Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), the landmark United States Supreme Court 
decision, recently had a near-death experience.  A  determined  group of right-wing 
law and order zealots, cheered on by the law enforcement establishment, tried to have 
Miranda overturned.  These zealots even succeeded in persuading one federal 
appellate court to hold that police no longer had to obey Miranda.  It took a surprising 
Supreme Court decision last June to resuscitate Miranda from the deathblow 
Miranda's enemies were endeavoring to inflict.  
   
Many provisions of the Bill of Rights are directed at protecting the rights of persons 
charged with crime.  The Bill of Rights is designed to prevent prosecutors and police 
from engaging in unfair, improper or abusive practices that savor of tyranny, even 
though they help catch more criminals.  Underlying the Bill of Rights, therefore, are at 
least two fundamental principles applicable to law enforcement: first, the end does not 
justify the means; and second, there are some things more important than punishing 
the guilty.  
   
For a century the standard procedures used by American police to obtain confessions 
from persons they hold in custody on criminal charges have been, as the Supreme 
Court noted in Miranda, "at odds ...  with our Nation's most cherished 
principles...."  Arrested persons are taken to back rooms in police stations, detained 
incommunicado, and pressured to confess.  There are no stenographers or recording 
devices present to provide a verbatim record of what goes on during the interrogation.  
   
Until around 1950 police use of the third degree--the infliction of physical or mental 
suffering--to extract confessions was common.  Although the third degree is still 
practiced, since the 1950's the most frequently utilized interrogation techniques have 
involved mental and psychological stratagems--trickery, deceit, deception, cajolery, 
subterfuge, chicanery, wheedling, false pretenses of sympathy, and various other 
artifices and ploys.  These techniques can and do induce innocent persons to make 
false confessions; a significant number of the 95 death row inmates who have been 
exonerated based on DNA evidence and released since 1973 had been convicted based 
in part on confessions obtained by police interrogation.  
   
In Miranda the Supreme Court found that custodial interrogation as carried on by 
police in this country involves "inherent compulsion," is "inherently coercive," and 
"exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of 
individuals."  Concluding that previous constitutional rules it had prescribed had 
failed to curb the widespread use of "menacing police interrogation procedures," the 
Court declined to impose a blanket ban on those procedures.  But it did hold that 
under the self-incrimination privilege (1) every person has a right to remain silent and 
a right to be advised prior to any custodial interrogation that anything he or she says 
may be used against him or her, (2) every  person has a right to consult with a lawyer 
before being subjected to custodial interrogation and to have the lawyer present during 
the interrogation, (3) the lawyer must be provided free of charge if the suspect is 
indigent, (4) a suspect may waive these Miranda rights, but only if advised of those 
rights before interrogation and only if the waiver is voluntarily and knowingly made, 
and (5) no confession secured in violation of Miranda's requirements is admissible in 
court.  
   
Although it is rooted in the harsh realities of police interrogation tactics and represents 
a noble effort to maintain a healthy balance between the individual and the state, 
Miranda has always been anathema to right-wingers; and in the last two decades 
conservative appointments to the Supreme Court have resulted in numerous decisions 
by that Court carving out exceptions to Miranda or otherwise weakening Miranda.  It 
was these decisions that were seized upon by the zealots who recently tried to slay 
Miranda.  
   
In 1997 FBI agents arrested one Charles Dickerson for robbing a Virginia bank. They 
interrogated Dickerson and procured a confession; prior to Dickerson's trial in federal 
court, however, the judge ruled the confession was inadmissible because the advice of 
rights--popularly known as the Miranda warnings--had been given after rather than 
before Dickerson confessed.  The government appealed the trial judge's pretrial ruling 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, contending that in fact 
Dickerson had been given the warnings before he confessed.  The Fourth Circuit then 
permitted two right-wing legal foundations to intervene in the case and argue that 
even if the confession violated Miranda it was nonetheless admissible under a 1968 
federal statute which allows admission of confessions inadmissible under 
Miranda.  Both Dickerson and the government maintained that the 1968 statute was 
unconstitutional.  
   
On Feb. 8, 1999, in a weird decision which described any FBI failure to give 
Dickerson the warnings prior to questioning as a "technical violation of Miranda," and 
which relied heavily on Supreme Court decisions eroding Miranda, the Fourth Circuit 
held, by a 2-1 vote, that the statute trumped Miranda and rendered the confession 
admissible, notwithstanding any Miranda violation.  
   
Both Dickerson and the government then asked the Supreme Court to review the 
Fourth Circuit decision that Miranda was no longer good law.  In late 1999 the Court 
agreed to hear the case, and appointed Paul Cassell, a professional prosecutor and 
right-wing law professor, to argue in favor of the Fourth Circuit decision.  Cassell, 
who regards Miranda as evil, is notorious for writing numerous articles claiming 
Miranda is an illegitimate decision benefitting only "criminals."  Meanwhile, 
numerous organizations of police and prosecutors such as the Fraternal Order of 
Police, the National Sheriffs' Association, the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police, the FBI Agents Association, and the National District Attorneys Association 
filed briefs urging the Supreme Court to overrule Miranda.  
   
In Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428 (2000), however, the Supreme Court 
stunned many observers by reaffirming Miranda and striking down the 1968 statute as 
unconstitutional.  Even more astonishing was the fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist 
wrote the opinion reversing the Fourth Circuit decision.  It was the first time in his 28 
years on the Court that Rehnquist had authored a pro-Miranda opinion.  Only  the 
Court's two most conservative justices, Scalia and Thomas, dissented.  
   
If the Fourth Circuit decision had been upheld, the Miranda warnings would have 
passed away.  Even more importantly, the basic right of each of us to have a lawyer 
present before and during custodial interrogation conducted by police would have 
perished.  
   
The story of how right-wingers and the crime control establishment recently 
attempted to murder Miranda v. Arizona must be remembered by all human rights 
supporters.  
 
